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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TAMPA DIVISION 
3LIONS PUBLISHING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v.       Case No. 8:19-cv-213-T-33TGW 
 
INTERACTIVE MEDIA CORP. 
d/b/a KANGURU SOLUTIONS, 
Defendant. 
______________________________/ 
ORDER 
This matter comes before the Court in consideration of 
Defendant Interactive Media Corp. d/b/a Kanguru Solutions’ 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, 
or in the Alternative for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 
# 11), filed on March 4, 2019. Plaintiff 3Lions Publishing, 
Inc. responded on March 10, 2019. (Doc. # 13). For the reasons 
that follow, the Motion is denied. 
I.  Background 
3Lions Publishing, Inc. (3LP) is a Florida corporation 
“that provides . . . information, solutions, and guidance to 
the healthcare industry regarding the implementation of 
safeguards to comply with the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA).” (Doc. # 1 at 1). Interactive 
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Media Corp. (IMC) is a “Massachusetts Corporation that 
describes itself as ‘an industry leader in providing secure 
hardware encrypted USB solutions, quality portable data 
storage, fully-integrated secure remote management, 
duplication equipment to organizations and businesses around 
the world.’” (Id. at 1-2). The Complaint alleges that IMC 
“blatantly committed trademark infringement on its website.” 
(Id. at 3). 
On August 25, 2017, 3LP received a federal trademark 
registration from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for 
the phrase “HIPAA Survival Guide” in International Classes 9, 
35, and 42. (Doc. # 1-3). That registration lists a “first 
use” date of August 31, 2009, and “first use in commerce” 
dates of March 15, 2013, as to Class 35 and March 16, 2016, 
as to Classes 9 and 42. (Id.). 
3LP alleges that IMC infringed on the trademark when IMC 
used the phrase “HIPAA Survival Guide” within a blog post 
dated October 31, 2012, on its website “to sell its healthcare 
compliance products and services” for which “it receives a 
financial benefit.” (Id. at 3). The blog post is entitled 
“HIPAA Survival Guide” and contains four sentences. (Doc. # 
1-2). The first sentence states, “Healthcare Informatics has 
a link to a HIPAA Survival Guide.” (Id.). The remaining three 
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sentences reference IMC/Kanguru-branded products that may 
help healthcare companies comply with HIPAA requirements. 
(Id.). 
3LP further alleges that IMC’s use of 3LP’s trademark on 
IMC’s website “attract[s] larger amounts of internet traffic, 
often by misleading consumers into believing [IMC] [is] 
associated, affiliated with, or authorized by 3LP.” (Doc. # 
1 at 3). Further, 3LP indicates that it “never entered into 
any agreement with [IMC] that would permit [IMC] to adapt or 
otherwise use the [trademark].” (Id.). 3LP also alleges that 
IMC’s “acts of trademark infringement were willful and 
deliberate.” (Id. at 4). 
3LP initiated this action on January 28, 2019, asserting 
two claims under the Lanham Act for false designation of 
origin and trademark infringement. (Doc. # 1). IMC moved to 
dismiss on March 4, 2019. (Doc. # 11). 3LP has responded (Doc. 
# 13), and IMC has replied. (Doc. # 26). The Motion is ripe 
for review. 
II. Legal Standard 
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this 
Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint 
and construes them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 
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1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the 
plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations 
in the complaint. See Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But, 
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires 
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level. 
 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal 
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true 
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan 
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “The scope of review 
must be limited to the four corners of the complaint” and 
attached exhibits. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 
1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). 
Additionally, motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) are governed by a two-
part analysis. First, the Court determines whether the 
plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to subject the 
defendant to the forum state’s long-arm statute. Future Tech. 
Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th 
Cir. 2000). Second, the Court evaluates whether sufficient 
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minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum 
state, such that jurisdiction does not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. 
The plaintiff has the initial burden to show that the 
Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Meier ex 
rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 
(11th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must allege “sufficient facts 
to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” Estate of 
Scutieri v. Chambers, 386 F. App’x 951, 956 (11th Cir. 2010). 
Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Meier, 288 F.3d at 
1269.  
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant to challenge 
those allegations. Id. If the defendant submits affidavits 
challenging jurisdiction, the burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to substantiate the allegations in the complaint 
with evidence supporting jurisdiction. Id. Ultimately, 
reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor if 
the evidence conflicts. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 
(11th Cir. 1990). However, any doubt about the reach of the 
Florida long-arm statute and the Court’s jurisdiction are 
resolved in favor of the defendant and against jurisdiction. 
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Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2007). 
III. Analysis 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
Although IMC first argues that the Court should dismiss 
3LP’s Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), the Court’s ability to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over IMC presents a threshold issue. See Madara, 
916 F.2d at 1514 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the 
district court should have ruled on personal jurisdictional 
issues before considering a request to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim). As such, the Court first addresses whether 
personal jurisdiction over IMC is proper pursuant to 
Florida’s long-arm statute. 
1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute 
Florida’s long-arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(a) states 
that “a person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state . . . submits himself  . . . to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of [Florida] for any cause of action arising from any 
of the following acts: . . . [c]ommitting a tortious act 
within this state.” 
3LP’s Complaint states that IMC’s “tortious acts of 
trademark infringement all occurred either directly or 
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indirectly within this jurisdiction, as well as throughout 
the United States, and/or was specifically targeted at this 
jurisdiction.” (Doc. # 1 at 2). Further, 3LP claims that IMC 
“knew, or should have known, that its acts of trademark 
infringement targeted this jurisdiction and/or would have a 
direct impact on persons or entities located in this 
jurisdiction where the intellectual property was created, is 
stored and where the subject matter of this action resides.” 
(Id.). 
IMC’s Motion asserts that the Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over IMC because it does not conduct business in 
Florida. (Doc. # 11 at 17-19). In support, IMC provides a 
Declaration from its founder and president, Donald Brown. 
(Doc. # 11-1). Brown states in the Declaration that IMC does 
not employ any representatives within Florida, does not 
solicit business in Florida, does not maintain offices in 
Florida, does not pay taxes to Florida, does not avail itself 
of the laws of Florida, and had no reason to foresee it would 
be sued in Florida. (Doc. # 11-1 at 2). Further, IMC argues 
that 3LP’s assertions that IMC engaged in tortious acts are 
mere legal conclusions without any factual support and 
therefore are not entitled to a “presumption of correctness.” 
(Id. at 18). 
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As a preliminary matter, 3LP’s allegations contained 
within the Complaint are sufficient to meet the initial 
pleading requirements to establish personal jurisdiction. See 
Wash. Capital Corp. v. Milandco, Ltd., Inc., 695 So. 2d 838, 
841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (explaining a plaintiff satisfies its 
initial pleading requirements by tracking the language of the 
long-arm statute without pleading supporting facts or by 
alleging specific facts that demonstrate that the defendant’s 
actions fit within one or more subsections of the statute). 
Florida’s long-arm statute states in relevant part that a 
nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Florida for “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.” 
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). This portion of the statute 
provides for specific personal jurisdiction “over causes of 
action arising from or related to the defendant’s actions 
within Florida and concerns a nonresident defendant’s 
contacts with Florida only as those contacts related to the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. 
v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2013). 
Under the long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant need 
not have a physical presence in Florida for the Court to 
assert personal jurisdiction. See Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 
2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002). Instead, such a nonresident 
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defendant need only commit a tortious act that causes injury 
within Florida. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 736 F.3d at 1353. 
Trademark infringement is treated as a “tortious act” for 
purposes of the Florida long-arm statute. See Id.; see also 
Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 
2008). Given that the Complaint alleges IMC committed 
“tortious acts” within this jurisdiction, 3LP has 
sufficiently tracked the language of the long-arm statute to 
meet the initial pleading standards for personal 
jurisdiction.  
Nonetheless, IMC’s assertions in its Motion are 
sufficient to shift the burden back to 3LP to produce evidence 
in support of jurisdiction. See Meier, 288 F.3d at 1269. 3LP’s 
response to IMC’s Motion provides that personal jurisdiction 
is proper because IMC’s website “is accessible within 
Florida” and “because there were direct sales made to persons 
in Florida from its website.” (Doc # 13 at 10).  
3LP also argues that the Complaint’s facts cannot be 
distinguished from the facts of Licciardello. In 
Licciardello, a nonresident defendant posted a website that 
was accessible to the public in Florida and that used a 
resident plaintiff’s trademarked name and picture — thereby 
implying that the plaintiff endorsed the defendant’s skill as 
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a personal manager. 544 F.3d at 1282. The website offered CDs 
for sale that provided management advice and other career 
assistance. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, in reversing the 
district court’s dismissal of the case, found that personal 
jurisdiction existed because trademark infringement on a 
website causes injury in Florida “by virtue of the website’s 
accessibility in Florida.” Id. at 1283. 
However, Licciardello pre-dates the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision in Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 
So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 2010), which held in the context of 
a defamation claim that a website “must not only be accessible 
in Florida, but also be accessed in Florida” to subject a 
nonresident to Florida’s jurisdiction under the long-arm 
statute. Nevertheless, as explained in Meier, the Court draws 
all reasonable inferences in 3LP’s favor when the evidence 
concerning jurisdiction conflicts. See Meier, 288 F.3d at 
1269 (“Where the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting 
evidence conflict with the defendant’s affidavits, the court 
must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.”). 
3LP’s Complaint alleges IMC utilized 3LP’s trademarked 
phrase “HIPAA Survival Guide” within a blog post on its 
website, thereby committing the intentionally tortious act of 
Case 8:19-cv-00213-VMC-TGW   Document 31   Filed 06/10/19   Page 10 of 23 PageID 266
11 
 
trademark infringement. In support, 3LP attaches a copy of 
IMC’s blog post at https://store.kanguru.com/blogs/archives/ 
6818326-hipaa-survival-guide. (Doc. # 1-2). 3LP is a Florida 
corporation with its principal place of business located 
within Florida. (Doc. # 1 at 1).  
As such, the Court can reasonably infer that the webpage 
containing the blog post was accessed within Florida by at 
least one person or entity — 3LP. Further, 3LP argues — and 
IMC does not dispute — that IMC has made sales, however small 
or insignificant, through its website to persons or entities 
located in Florida. (Doc. # 13 at 9). IMC’s own founder and 
president states that “[a] direct sale of IMC’s products 
through its website to persons or entities located in Florida 
would be insubstantial and isolated.” (Doc. # 11-1 at 3). 
Although IMC downplays the number of sales in Florida, the 
Court draws the reasonable inference that IMC’s website — and 
the offending blog post in particular — was also accessed 
within Florida by persons and entities other than 3LP. 
Therefore, the Court finds 3LP has met its burden of 
establishing personal jurisdiction over IMC under Florida’s 
long-arm statute. 
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2. Minimum Contacts 
The Court now evaluates whether sufficient minimum 
contacts exist between IMC and Florida such that jurisdiction 
does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 320 (1945). In doing so, the Court considers relevant 
factors such as the burden on IMC, Florida’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, 3LP’s interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief, and the judicial system’s 
interest in resolving the dispute. See World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
3LP alleges in its Complaint that IMC committed the 
intentional tort of trademark infringement. (Doc. # 1 at 4).  
The Eleventh Circuit has held that intentional torts are acts 
that create a “substantial connection” with the forum state 
such that the acts may support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who otherwise has 
no other contacts with the forum state. See Licciardello, 544 
F.3d at 1285. Indeed, this Court has recognized that “a number 
of courts” have held the minimum contacts requirement is met 
and a defendant should anticipate being hailed into a court 
in the relevant jurisdiction “where a defendant’s tortious 
conduct is intentionally and purposefully directed at a 
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resident of the forum.” New Lennox Indus. v. Fenton, 510 F. 
Supp. 2d 893, 904 (M.D. Fla. 2007).  
As the Complaint alleges that IMC committed the 
intentional tort of trademark infringement against 3LP, a 
Florida resident, the Court finds that the Complaint 
establishes that sufficient minimum contacts exist between 
IMC and Florida. See R&R Games, Inc. v. Fundex Games, Ltd., 
No. 8:12-cv-01957-T-27TBM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28426, at 
*12 (M.D. Fla. 2013)(“Applying Calder, courts assessing 
allegations of trademark infringement have consistently found 
the minimum contacts inquiry satisfied because trademark 
infringement is an intentional tort directed toward the state 
in which the plaintiff is domiciled.”). 3LP alleges that it 
was injured by the intentional misconduct of IMC, a non-
Florida resident, who expressly aimed its trademark 
infringement at Florida and throughout the country via the 
internet. (Doc. # 1 at 2).  
Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984), 3LP is not required to travel to 
IMC’s residence in Massachusetts to obtain a remedy because 
“[a]n individual injured in [Florida] need not go to 
[Massachusetts] to seek redress from persons who, though 
remaining in [Massachusetts], knowingly cause the injury in 
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[Florida].” The Court also finds that Florida has a strong 
interest in affording its residents a forum to obtain relief 
from intentional misconduct of nonresidents causing injury in 
Florida. See generally Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 
Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir. 1996); Allerton v. State 
Dep’t of Ins., 635 So. 2d 36, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that 3LP has alleged facts 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over IMC. 
B. Failure to State a Claim 
Having determined that jurisdiction over IMC is proper, 
the Court turns to IMC’s argument that the Complaint should 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The Court considers the false designation of origin and 
trademark infringement claims separately. 
1. False Designation of Origin Claim 
3LP first alleges that IMC’s use of “HIPAA Survival 
Guide” in IMC’s October 31, 2012 blog post “is likely to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, or [to] deceive others as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of [IMC] with 3LP, or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of commercial 
activities with 3LP.” (Doc # 1 at 4). To successfully plead 
a false designation of origin claim, a complaint must allege 
that (1) the plaintiff had enforceable trademark rights in 
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the mark, and (2) the defendant used a mark similar enough to 
the plaintiff’s to create a likelihood of consumer confusion. 
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 
106 F.3d 355, 358 (11th Cir. 1997), modified, 122 F.3d 1379 
(11th Cir. 1997).  
IMC asserts that 3LP did not have enforceable rights in 
the trademark as of October 31, 2012, because IMC’s usage of 
“HIPAA Survival Guide” predates 3LP’s usage of the same. (Doc 
# 11 at 10). As shown in the Complaint, IMC’s blog post 
contains a date of October 12, 2012, while 3LP’s federal 
trademark registration was issued on August 15, 2017. The 
registration indicates that 3LP first used “HIPAA Survival 
Guide” in commerce on either March 15, 2013, or March 16, 
2016. (Id.). Given those dates, IMC states that its use of 
“HIPAA Survival Guide” in commerce was earlier than 3LP’s use 
in commerce. 
3LP contends the dates of first use in commerce listed 
on the federal trademark registration are inaccurate and the 
result of a miscommunication between 3LP and its counsel. 
(Doc. # 13 at 5). Despite the mistake, 3LP claims it obtained 
enforceable rights in the trademark beginning with its first 
use of “HIPAA Survival Guide” in 2009. (Id. at 4-5). However, 
the Supreme Court has held that “[r]ights in a trademark are 
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determined by the date of the mark’s first use in commerce.” 
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015).  
While 3LP’s assertions in response to Defendant’s Motion 
are beyond the four corners of the Complaint, 3LP does 
indicate within the Complaint that “for nearly a decade, 3LP 
has used the Mark continuously in commerce on its website . 
. . and its store front, located on the Internet at 
store.hipaasurvivalguide.com.” (Doc. #1 at 5). In support, 
3LP attached to its Complaint an archived internet screen 
capture of www.hipaasurvivalguide.com. (Doc # 1-4). The 
attachment clearly shows that the webpage existed as early as 
May 1, 2009, thereby supporting 3LP’s assertion in the 
Complaint that it has used “HIPAA Survival Guide” for more 
than a decade. Accepting as true the factual allegations in 
the Complaint and construing them in the light most favorable 
to 3LP, the Court finds that 3LP has pled sufficient facts to 
show it had enforceable trademark rights in the phrase “HIPAA 
Survival Guide” prior to the date of IMC’s blog post. 
As the Complaint contains factual support for 3LP’s 
usage of the trademark in commerce prior to IMC’s blog post, 
the Court turns to the second prong of a false designation of 
origin claim. Here, IMC used the exact phrase contained within  
3LP’s federally registered trademark. Therefore, IMC clearly 
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used marks “similar enough to cause confusion.” Lone Star 
Steakhouse, 106 F.3d at 359. Therefore, the Court denies the 
Motion as to the false designation of origin claim. 
  2. Trademark Infringement Claim 
3LP also alleges that IMC’s use of “HIPAA Survival Guide” 
in IMC’s October 31, 2012, blog post “constitutes 
infringement . . . in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125 
of the Lanham Act.” (Doc # 1 at 5). To successfully plead a 
trademark infringement claim, 3LP must allege “(1) that [3LP] 
possess[es] a valid mark, (2) that [IMC] used the mark, (3) 
that [IMC’s] use of the mark occurred ‘in commerce,’ (4) that 
[IMC] used the mark ‘in connection with the sale . . . or 
advertising of any goods,’ and (5) that [IMC] used the mark 
in a manner likely to confuse consumers.” N. Am. Med. Corp. 
v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
The Court finds that the Complaint alleges facts 
sufficient to establish that 3LP possesses a valid trademark. 
Further, the Complaint establishes that IMC used the 
trademarked language “HIPAA Survival Guide” in its blog post 
dated October 31, 2012. (Doc. # 1-2). 
 Having determined that the Complaint sufficiently 
alleges facts to support the first two elements, the Court 
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turns to the use in commerce and use in connection with the 
sale or advertising of goods requirements. The Lanham Act 
deems a trademark to be used in commerce on goods when 
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their 
containers or the displays associated therewith or 
on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the 
nature of the goods makes such placement 
impracticable, then on documents associated with 
the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold 
or transported in commerce. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1127. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he 
nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical 
home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would 
satisfy the Lanham Act’s ‘in commerce’ requirement.” 
Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 
1195 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. 
v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).  
In its Complaint, 3LP asserts that IMC “used the 
[trademark] in order to sell its healthcare compliance 
products and services.” (Doc. # 1 at 3). Further, 3LP attached 
to the Complaint a copy of IMC’s internet blog post that 
advertises IMC/Kanguru-branded products allowing companies to 
comply with HIPAA requirements immediately following the use 
of the phrase “HIPAA Survival Guide”. (Doc. #1-2). Thus, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 3LP, the Court 
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finds that 3LP has plausibly alleged the third and fourth 
elements of a trademark infringement claim.  
Finally, 3LP must plausibly allege that IMC used “HIPAA 
Survival Guide” in a manner likely to confuse consumers. The 
Court weighs seven relevant factors to determine whether 
IMC’s alleged use of the trademark is likely to confuse 
consumers: 
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the 
similarity between the plaintiff’s mark and the 
allegedly infringing mark; (3) the similarity 
between the products and services offered by the 
plaintiff and defendant; (4) the similarity of the 
sales methods; (5) the similarity of advertising 
methods; (6) the defendant’s intent, e.g., does the 
defendant hope to gain competitive advantage by 
associating his product with the plaintiff’s 
established mark; and (7) actual confusion. 
 
Alliance Metals, Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 
907 (11th Cir. 2000). “The most persuasive factor on likely 
confusion is proof of actual confusion.” Conagra, Inc. v. 
Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984). 
IMC contends that the “[C]omplaint makes a very 
generalized allegation that the alleged unlawful use of the 
[trademark] ‘enables [IMC] to attract larger amounts of 
internet traffic, often by misleading consumers into 
believing they are associates, affiliated with or authorized 
by 3LP.’” (Doc. # 1 at 3). While IMC’s argument is well-
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taken, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of 3LP. Here, the Complaint alleges that 3LP has used the 
trademarked phrase “HIPAA Survival Guide” for nearly a 
decade. Further, 3LP contends that IMC utilized the exact 
trademarked phrase in a blog post without crediting 3LP as 
the owner of such term. While the products and services 
provided by 3LP and IMC may not be substantially similar, 
they are similar enough for IMC to have included 3LP’s 
trademarked phrase in advertising IMC’s own products related 
to HIPAA compliance.  
The Complaint also states that 3LP has used the 
trademarked phrase “in commerce on its website . . . and [at] 
its store front, located on the Internet.” (Doc. # 1 at 5). 
While the Complaint does not identify any actual confusion 
that has resulted from the alleged trademark infringement, 
such confusion is plausible given that IMC reproduced the 
exact phrase to which 3LP had trademark rights.  
In short, many of the relevant factors weigh in favor of 
a likelihood of consumer confusion. Thus, at this early stage 
of the litigation, the Court finds that 3LP has plausibly 
alleged the final element of its trademark infringement 
claim. 
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3. Defendant’s Fair Use Affirmative Defense 
 IMC also asserts in its Motion that its “inclusion of 
the claimed [trademark] in [the] blog post constitutes a non-
infringing, non-trademark, fair use.” (Doc. # 11 at 12). Fair 
use is a statutory affirmative defense. See KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 
(2004); see also Int’l Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006).  
The Court only considers a fair use affirmative defense 
when analyzing a 12(b)(6) motion if “the facts necessary to 
make the determination are evident on the face of the 
complaint.” Land’s End at Sunset Beach Cmty. Ass’n v. Land’s 
End Acquisition Corp., No. 8:16-cv-828, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
191616, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2016); see also Kelly-Brown 
v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2013)(“Affirmative 
defenses may be adjudicated at this stage in the litigation, 
however, where the facts necessary to establish the defense 
are evident on the face of the complaint.”). Thus, although 
IMC provides analysis in support of its fair use defense 
within its Motion, the Court only looks to whether the defense 
is apparent on the face of 3LP’s Complaint at this stage of 
the case. 
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 The fair use defense requires a defendant to prove “that 
its use is ‘(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive 
sense, and (3) in good faith.’” Int’l Stamp Art, Inc., 456 
F.3d at 1274 (quoting EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, 
Connors, & Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 
2000)(citing 15 U.S.C § 1115(b)(4))). It is not clear on the 
face of the Complaint that IMC’s usage of “HIPAA Survival 
Guide” constitutes fair use given that the blog post’s title 
included the same phrase trademarked by 3LP and within the 
context of IMC promoting its products. Therefore, the Court 
declines to dismiss the Complaint based on IMC’s fair use 
affirmative defense and denies the Motion. However, IMC may 
raise its fair use defense again at the summary judgment 
stage. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 
(1) Defendant Interactive Media Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, or in the 
Alternative for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. # 
11) is DENIED. 
(2) Interactive Media Corp.’s Answer to the Complaint is due 
within 14 days of the date of this Order. 
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DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 
10th day of June, 2018. 
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